An Analysis of Pricing in the U.S. Cotton Seed Market by Shi, Guanming et al.
  1





Department of Agricultural & Applied Economics 




Department of Agricultural & Applied Economics 




Jean Paul Chavas 
Department of Agricultural & Applied Economics 












Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association 






Copyright 2009 by Guanming Shi, Kyle Stiegert, and Jean Paul Chavas. All rights reserved. 
Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any 
means, if this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
 
   2
An Analysis of Pricing in the U.S. Cotton Seed Market 
 
Abstract: The purpose of the research in this paper is to investigate the impact of differentiated 
vertical strategies by agricultural biotechnology firms in the U.S. cottonseed market.  The 
model advances the measurement of industry concentration to consider substitution/ 
complementarity relationships among differentiated products delivered under different 
vertical structures. We find evidence of sub-additive pricing in the stacking of bundled 
biotech traits. Prices paid by farmers for cottonseed sold under vertical integration are 
found to be higher than under licensing. The model is flexible and allows for evaluation 
of the effects of changing market structures. The parameters on traditional measures of 
concentration indicate that higher concentration leads to higher prices.  The effects of 
cross-market concentrations stress the need to conduct the analysis in a multi-market 
context.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The advent of biotechnology seeds has been a catalyst for much change directly or 
indirectly impacting virtually all parts of the global agro-food complex. Within the agricultural 
biotech industry itself, the strategies to profit from patented seed traits have been a major driver 
of firm behavior. In some cases, agricultural biotechnology firms will license patented traits to 
downstream seed firms. This generates a stream of revenue from technology fees assessed on 
bags of seed sold to producers. In other cases, agricultural biotech firms with trait patents merge 
with seed firms to produce and market biotech seeds within a single enterprise. The stakes of the 
game are quite high and include control of large shares of high-valued end-use markets involving 
billions of dollars of sales.      3
When firms possess intellectual property rights (IPRs) such as in the case of agricultural 
biotechnology firms, differing incentives exist for vertical integration, strategic alliances, and 
contracting. Graff, Rausser and Small (2003) suggest that vertical integration may be motivated 
by the complementarity of assets in the agricultural biotechnology and seed industries. If IPRs 
are well defined and transaction costs are low, contracting and strategic alliances are more likely. 
However, if IPRs are not well defined, biotech companies might have an incentive to integrate 
downstream. Goodhue, Rausser, Scotchmer and Simon (2002) point out that the incentives to 
vertically merge might be driven by differing expected profits between eventual buyers and 
sellers of assets.  
There are also compelling arguments in the literature that the vertical integration 
occurring in the agricultural biotechnology industry may be motivated by firm strategic 
considerations (e.g., Kalaitzandonakes and Hayenga, 2000; Fernandez-Cornejo, 2004; Shi, 2009).  
Complex strategic possibilities emerge when vertically integrated biotechology (VIB) firms also 
derive revenue from technology fees generated by competing firms’ seed sales. The VIB firm 
may want to raise the technology fee on other seed firms so that its own seed division gains a 
competitive advantage in final seed sales. In other instances, the biotech firm may want to lower 
the tech fee to give their contracted seed firms a pricing advantage leading to widespread and 
rapid adoption of their patented traits.  
Several other dimensions of the industry are likely to also impact these decisions. Seed 
breeding is an inexact science and developing the highest quality seeds for differing agronomic 
conditions requires considerable investments in human and capital resources many years prior to 
a successful seed release.  The VIB firm may have seed that competes well in some regions and 
not well in other regions. The VIB firm may find it advantageous to license its traits to firms that   4
do not compete with its seed division in certain regions. The VIB firm could strategically control 
the introduction of traits in various licensing arrangements in ways that help assure the continued 
growth of its own seed division. Additionally, the seed available for sale in the current year is 
constrained by the amount grown for the seed industry in the previous year.  
  The purpose of the research in this paper is to investigate the impact of different vertical 
strategies by the biotechnology firms in the U.S. cottonseed market. The model advances the 
measurement of industry concentration to consider substitution/complementarity relationships 
among differentiated products delivered under different modes of vertical structure.  More 
specifically, we evaluate vertically aligned markets with both integrated and licensing 
components.  The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) has been commonly used in applied 
industrial organization as a measure of market concentration (e.g., Winston, 2006). We 
generalize this measure into vertical Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes (termed VHHI) that capture 
both horizontal and vertical market concentration under product differentiation. In turn, the 
VHHIs are incorporated into a model of price determination capturing the effects of imperfect 
competition on pricing. The model is developed under the presumption of quantity setting 
strategies, which fits reasonably well with the market institutions for agricultural seeds.  Due to 
long production lags, the quantity of seed produced in a given year is chosen ahead of the pricing 
decision.  
As applied to the U.S. cottonseed market, the econometric analysis provides useful 
information on the implications of product differentiation for cottonseed prices. It evaluates the 
differential pricing of conventional seeds as well as patented biotech seeds, including herbicide 
tolerance (HT) seeds, insect resistant (IR) seeds, and stacked seeds (where HT and IR traits are 
bundled together). We find evidence of sub-additive pricing in stacked seeds. The analysis also   5
allows an evaluation of the effects of imperfect competition on pricing. As expected, we find that 
increased market concentration tends to increase price in the corresponding market. But our 
estimates also show evidence of cross-market complementarities that mitigate the price-
enhancing effects of market power. Finally, we document how vertical organization affects 
cottonseed pricing.   
 
2.  Model 
The industrial organization model in this paper is designed from quantity setting games to 
evaluate markets with significant product differentiation and modal vertical strategies.  Shi, 
Chavas, and Stiegert (2008) developed the framework for multiproduct markets, and Shi and 
Chavas (2009) extended the model to incorporate its vertical components.  In this paper, we 
briefly describe the model in the context of the biotech cottonseed market.  The final goods 
market is comprised of N firms producing up to M outputs: N = {1, …, N}; M = {1, …, M}.  The 
production and marketing of final goods engages potentially an upstream technology markets 
under V alternative vertical structures (e.g., vertical contract, integration).  The output vector 
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n
m y τ  denotes the 
quantity the m
th good produced by the n
th firm under the τ
th vertical structure, m ∈ M, n ∈ N, τ ∈ 
V ≡ {1, …, V}.  
Each firm maximizes profit within and across marketing channels. With the potential for 
implicit or explicit contracts between upstream technology provider and the downstream firm, 
we want to examine how the exercise of market power can affect both horizontal and vertical 
markets for cottonseed.  We place no restriction on how pricing occurs in different vertical 
structures.  In other words, through a flexible set of firm choices (different labels, brands,   6
advertising, selling strategies, etc.) prices for a given product are allowed to vary across vertical 
structures. The price-dependent demand for the m
th output under the τ
th vertical structure is 
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n
m y p ) ( τ .  
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represents the n-th firm’s total costs of production and marketing. Assuming Cournot behavior in 
the final goods market, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the n
th firm for the m
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Equation (1c) is the complementary slackness condition which applies whether the m
th 
output is produced by the n
th firm in the τ
th vertical structure (
n
m y τ  > 0) or not (
n
m y τ  = 0). As such, 
(1c) holds even if the firm does not produce the full array of differentiated products. And it 
applies for any vertical structure selected by the firm.      
For the n-th firm, the cost function Cn(y
n) includes fixed cost Fn(Sn) satisfying Fn(∅) = 0, 
where Sn = {(j,τ): 
n
j y τ  > 0, j∈M, τ∈V} is the set of positive outputs. The cost function is 
assumed to take the form Cn(y
n) = Fn(Sn) + 
n
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where the second and third terms represent linear and quadratic variable cost, respectively. This 
implies that marginal costs are linear:  
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n∈N.  Fixed costs can affect pricing. Under a given vertical structure, such fixed costs can come 
from two potential sources: the upstream industry (e.g., the investment in R&D for a trait); and 
the downstream industry (e.g., fixed cost of seed development and/or setup cost of establishing a 
vertical structure). In either case, fixed costs must be recovered and may require departures from 
marginal cost pricing to sustain the viability of the firm. In addition, efficiency gains may be 
possible under alternative vertical organizations and through scope economies. Such scenarios 





b) for some S
a ⊂ M∪V and S
b ⊂ M∪V, i.e. when the joint provision 
of  } ) , (( : {
a n
ju
a j y y S ∈ = τ  and } ) , (( : {
b n
ju
b j y y S ∈ = τ  reduces fixed cost (Baumol, Panzar and 
Willig, 1982, p. 75). This can apply to fixed cost in the upstream technology (e.g., R&D 
investment contributing to the joint production of 
a y  and 
b y ) as well as fixed cost in the 
downstream technology (e.g., setup cost of establishing alternative vertical structures). In the 
first case, efficiency gains would be obtained from the joint development of technology used to 
produce outputs 
a y  and 
b y . In the second case, efficiency gains could be generated from 
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s =  ∈ [0, 1] as the market share of the n
th firm for the m
th product in the τ
th vertical   8
structure. Dividing equation (1c) by Ymτ and summing across all n ∈ N, we obtain the following 
result.  
Proposition 1: The pricing of the m-th product under the τ
th vertical structure satisfies   
∑∑ ∈∈ ⋅ ⋅ − + =
MV k ku u km u u km u km m m Y H c c p τ τ τ τ τ α , , , ] [ , (2) 
where  





ku s s τ ,   (3) 
with m, k ∈ M and u, τ ∈ V.  
 
Following Shi and Chavas (2009), the term defined in (3), Hkm,uτ,  is the vertical 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (VHHI).  Note that Hkm,uτ ∈ [0, 1], and that Hkm,uτ → 0 under 
prefect competition when there are many active firms in all markets.  It follows that the part of 
the price equation (2) that includes the Hkm,uτ’s reflect departures from competitive conditions. It 
will be useful to identify this part explicitly by defining   
∑∑ ∈∈ ⋅ ⋅ − =
MV k ku u km u u km u km m Y H c IC τ τ τ τ α , , , ] [ .   (4) 
Given Hkm,uτ → 0 under prefect competition and using (2), it follows that ICmτ in (4) 
provides a measure of the effects of imperfect competition on prices. There are four terms that 
frame ICmτ in equation (4) and each provide information about how noncompetitive pricing can 
arise, reflecting the exercise of market power in the m
th product market using the τ
th vertical 
structure. With Hkm,uτ ∈ [0, 1], note that Hkm,uτ increases with market concentration; and it 
reaches its maximum (Hkm,uτ = 1) under monopoly. As such, ICmτ  in (4) provides a convenient 
measure of how market concentration and the exercise of market power affect pricing. Equations 
(2)-(4) are central to our empirical analysis below.    9
It is clear that public policy concerns about imperfect competition (i.e. merger policy, 
price fixing, cartels, abuse of dominance) remains principally concerned with the potential 
negative impacts of concentration on competition (Coates and Ulrich, 2009). Various measures 
of market concentration have been used to assess firms’ exercise of market power. One common 
and time-honored measure is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), defined as the sum of 
squared market shares across all firms in the relevant market. When there is a single product (M 
= 1) and a single vertical structure (V = 1), note that H11,11 is the traditional HHI.  As a rule of 
thumb, HHI > 0.18 is considered as a threshold that raises concerns about the degree of 
competition (Whinston, 2008). As Coates and Ulrich (2009) report, the decision to challenge 
mergers at the Federal Trade Commission remains focused on HHIs mainly in the 0.20 to 0.50 
range. Given c11,11 ≥ 0 and α11,11 < 0, equations (3)-(4) indicate that an increase in the HHI H11,11 
(simulating an increase in market power) is associated with an increase in IC11, and thus an 
increase in price p11.  
Equations (2)-(4) extend the HHI to a multi-product context (when M > 1) and under 
various vertical structures (when V > 1). When k ≠ m and u = τ, it shows that a rise in the “cross-
market” VHHI Hkm,ττ would be associated with an increase (a decrease) in ICmτ if [ckm,ττ - αkm,ττ] 
> 0 (< 0). This indicates that, under vertical structure τ, the sign of [ckm,ττ - αkm,ττ] affects the 
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 > 0 (< 0) when   10
products k and m are substitutes (complements) on the supply side, corresponding to situations 
where increasing 
n
m y τ  tends to increase (decrease) the marginal cost of 
n
k y τ . Note that the 
complementary case (where ckm,ττ  < 0) contributes to economies of scope (Baumol et al., p. 75), 
where multi-output production reduces cost. It follows that the term [ckm,ττ - αkm,ττ] would be 
positive (negative) when 
n
m y τ  and 
n
k y τ  behave as substitutes (complements) on the supply side 
and demand side. From equations (2)-(4), it follows that the qualitative effects of the market 
concentration terms {Hkm,ττ} on ICmτ and on price pmτ depend on the nature of substitution or 
complementarity among outputs (through the terms [ckm,ττ - αkm,ττ]). It means that a rise in Hkm,ττ 
would contribute to an increase (a decrease) in ICmτ when ykτ and ymτ are substitutes 
(complements).  
Of special interest here are the effects of vertical structures on pricing. Consider the case 
where u ≠ τ and k = m. Then, equations (3) and (4) also show how vertical structures influence 
prices. They show that a rise in VHHI Hmm,uτ would be associated with an increase (a decrease) 
in ICmτ if [cmm,uτ - αmm,uτ] > 0 (< 0).  This indicates that, for a given product m, the sign of [cmm,uτ 
- αmm,uτ] affects the nature and magnitude of departure from competitive pricing. As just 
discussed, we expect [cmm,uτ - αmm,uτ] > 0 (< 0) when product m exhibits substitution 
(complementarity) across vertical structures u and τ. Thus the terms Hmm,uτ’s in equations (3)-(4) 
show how the nature of substitution or complementarity across vertical structures influences the 
effects of market concentration on prices. It indicates that a rise in Hmm,uτ would contribute to an 
increase (a decrease) in ICmτ when ymu and ymτ are substitutes (complements).  
Are there conditions under which vertical structures would have no effect on the Lerner 
index? Intuitively, this would occur if products were perfect substitutes across vertical structures   11
on the demand side as well as on the supply side. Perfect substitution on the supply side 
corresponds to situations where the cost function takes the form Cn(y
n) = 




n y y C , implying that cmτ  = cm and ckm,uτ  = ckm for m ∈ M and τ and u ∈ V. 







 ≡ αkm,uτ  
= αkm for k, m ∈ M and all u, τ ∈ V. As shown by Shi and Chavas (2009), perfect substitution 
across vertical structures implies that prices in (2) no longer depend on vertical organization, 
with pmτ = pm for all τ ∈ V.  This indicates how to test for the effects of vertical structures on 
prices. It involves the restrictions of perfect substitution: cmτ  = cm, ckm,uτ  = ckm and αkm,uτ  = αkm 
for k, m ∈ M and all u, τ ∈ V. These restrictions become simple testable hypotheses in equations 
(2)-(4). They will be tested empirically below in our investigation of the effects of vertical 
structures on pricing.  
Equation (3) shows that our VHHI’s Hkm,uτ provide the relevant information to assess the 
role of market power in a vertical sector. As just discussed, this applies in the presence of 
product differentiation where products are not perfect substitutes across vertical structures. 
Below, we analyze the pricing implications of vertical structures with an application to the US 
cottonseed industry. In this application, the upstream firm develops the seed production 
technology (e.g., a biotech firm developing patented seeds by inserting genetic material in the 
basic seed germplasm), and the downstream firm uses the upstream technology to produce and 
sell the seeds to farmers. In this context, we will investigate the pricing implications of vertical 
ownership versus licensing in the US cottonseed industry.   
 
   12
3.  Empirical Model 
Our analysis uses a data set providing detailed information on the US cotton seed market. 
The data were collected by dmrkynetec [hereafter dmrk]. The dmrk data come from a stratified 
sample of US cotton farmers surveyed annually in 2000, 2002-2007.
1 The survey provides farm-
level information on seed purchases, acreage, seed types, and seed prices. It was collected using 
computer assisted telephone interviews. Farmers typically buy their seeds locally, and seeds are 
usually developed for different agro-climate conditions in different regions. We define the “local 
market” at the Crop Reporting Districts (CRD)
2 level. Our analysis focuses on the High Plains of 
Texas and Oklahoma, a major cotton-producing region. Using equation (3), we introduce a price 
equation with binary terms that partitions cottonseed transactions based on different genetic 
characteristics and different vertical structures.  Equation (3) reflects a structural approach that 
measures the determinants of multiproduct pricing under imperfect competition and modal 
vertical structures.  We focus our attention on the case of two vertical structures: vertical 
integration (v) and licensing (ℓ). Let Dτ ∈ {0, 1} be dummy variables for vertical structures, 
satisfying Dτ = 1 for the τ-th vertical structure and Dτ = 0 otherwise, τ ∈ V = {ℓ, v}. We consider 
4 seed types: conventional (T1 = 1), single trait herbicide tolerance HT (T2 = 1), single trait insect 
resistance IR (T3 = 1), and bundling/stacking of HT and IR (T4 = 1). Since the conventional seed 
does not need to add any additional biotech trait, we assume the vertical structure for the 
conventional seed is not integrated (i.e. only ℓ). 
Note that our analysis allows cost (both fixed and variable) to vary across vertical 
structures. Under vertical integration v, R&D fixed cost can be recovered directly by the 
                                                 
1  The survey is stratified to over-sample producers with large acreage.  
2  A crop-reporting district (CRD) is defined by the US Department of Agriculture to reflect local agro-
climatic conditions.  In general, a CRD is larger than a county but smaller than a state.     13
integrated firm but the biotech firm may possibly face higher cost of integration. Under licensing 
ℓ, a royalty fee is paid by the seed company to the biotech firm. The fee raises the marginal cost 
of the licensing firm and should help the biotech firm recover its R&D investment. In general, 
the two vertical structures can vary both in terms of efficiency (e.g., which structures have lower 
cost?) and in terms of exercise of market power. Also, both assessments can be affected by the 
multi-product nature of the market. For example, the presence and magnitude of economies of 
scope can vary between vertical structures. And as discussed above, the presence of 
complementarity (or substitution) across vertically differentiated products can reduce (enhance) 
the firms’ ability to exercise market power. The empirical analysis presented below will shed 
some useful lights on these issues.  
We start with a standard model of hedonic pricing where the price of a good varies with 
its characteristics (e.g., following Rosen 1974). Consider the hedonic equation representing the 
determinants of the price p for a seed of type m sold with in the τ-th vertical structure  
pmτ = 
4
1 mk k u m kuTD τ ττ β δ φ ε
=∈ ++ + ∑∑ V X , (5a) 
where X is a vector of other relevant covariates, and εmτ is an error term with mean zero and 
finite variance.  
As shown in equations (2)-(4), we introduce market power effects in (5a) by specifying 
4
0, , 1 mk m u k m u k u k u ku HY T D ττ τ ββ β
=∈ =+ ∑∑ V ,   (5b) 




k s s ∑ ∈N τ  is the VHHI defined in (3), 
n
k s τ being the 
market share of the n-th firm in the market for the k-th seed type under the τ-th vertical structure. 
And when k ≠ m and u ≠ τ, Hkm,uτ provides a measure of cross-market concentration across   14
product types m and k and across vertical structures u and τ. Also, following (4), it follows from 
(5b) that that the exercise of market power in (5a)-(5b) is given by 
4
,, 1 mk m u k m u k u k u ku ICH Y T D ττ τ β
=∈ =∑∑ V , (6) 
where ICmτ → 0 under perfect competition. Equation (6) provides a convenient measure of the 
effect of imperfect competition under various vertical structures.     
 To illustrate, the equation estimated for conventional seeds (T1 = 1) is  
p1ℓ = 
4
01 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 1 1 1 1() kk kk v k v k v k H Y H Y TD TD X ββ β δ φ ε
= ++ + + + ∑ AA AA A A A A A A A , 
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= ++ + + + ∑ AA A .  
Similar equations can be written IR seed (T3 = 1) and for the bundled/stacked seed (T4 = 
1). However, the number of observations of vertically integrated seeds for these two types (T3v  
and T4v)  are not sufficient in our sample for valid construction of the VHHI’s. Therefore, for 
these two seed types, we examine the characteristic effects under different vertical structure, and 
the market concentration effects in the licensed markets only. 
Each CRD is presumed to represent the relevant market area for each transaction; thus, 
all H terms are calculated at that level. Each purchase observation is at farm-variety level. The   15
price p in equation (5a) is net seed price paid by farmers (in $ per bag
3).  Table 1 contains 
summary statistics from the data used in the analysis.  
The relevant covariates X include location, year dummies, each farm’s total cotton 
acreage, and binary terms covering the range of how each purchase was sourced. The location 
variables are defined as state dummies, capturing spatial heterogeneity in cropping systems and 
state level institutions such as the effectiveness of the state extension systems. Since the CRDs in 
the two states in our sample are adjacent to each other, we do not expect weather patterns, and 
yield potential differ much across the state border. The year dummies are included to capture the 
advances in hybrid and genetic technology, and possible event effects throughout the years of the 
study.  Farm acreage captures possible price discrimination effects related to farm size. Note that 
farmers may choose different sources for different seed varieties. Including source of purchase as 
an explanatory variable in (4a) captures possible price discrimination schemes affecting the seed 
price paid by farmers.  
                                                 
3  In the cottonseed market, farmers used to pay the price in two parts: the “seed price” and then the 
“technology fee”. More recently, biotech companies changed the pricing scheme, so that farmers only 
pay a single price which contains both the “seed price” and the “technology fee”.  To facilitate the 
analysis of pricing over the study period, we normalize the two part seed pricing in earlier years into 
the same single pricing format in recent years, i.e., $ per bag, with 250,000 seeds per bag.       16
Table 1. Summary statistics 
a/
 The data contain 4660 observations from 6 CRDs spanning 7 years (2000, 2002-2007). 
b/
 For the market concentration measurements H’s, we only report the summary statistics of those non 
zeros at the CRD level, therefore the number of observations is at most 6×7 = 42. 
c/ By symmetry, 
,, ,,  and  , 
ij ji ij v ji v HH HH ij == ≠
AA AA A A . 
 
4.  Econometric Results 
Equations (5a)-(5b) were estimated using the dmrk farm-level data for the High Plains 
region of Texas and Oklahoma. The model was estimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
to deal with the possible endogeneity of the H’s and Y’s. Because the demand for seed is a 
derived demand from farmers’ profit maximization, the willingness to pay can be interpreted in 
terms of marginal profit and the demand slope is the second derivative of farmers’ profit. By 


















∂  = αmk,uτ, 
cmk,uτ = ckm,τu, and βmk,uτ = [cmk,uτ - αmk,uτ], the following pretests of such restrictions are evaluated:  






Net Price ($/bag)  4660  122.76  85.39  7.45  642.65 
Farm size (acre)  4660  1186.85  1027.21  8  10040 
H11,ℓℓ   41 0.553  0.243  0.180  1 
H12,ℓℓ 
c 37  0.433  0.241  0.147  1 
H12,ℓv  14 0.375  0.235  0.029  0.838 
H13,ℓℓ  20 0.510  0.289  0.143  1 
H14,ℓℓ  36 0.467  0.195  0.194  0.831 
H22,ℓℓ   42 0.599  0.253  0.211  1 
H22,ℓv  15 0.199  0.131  0.010  0.431 
H22,vv  20 0.884  0.193  0.504  1 
H23,ℓℓ  22 0.522  0.256  0.148  1 
H23,vℓ  9 0.544  0.268  0.089  1 
H24,ℓℓ  42 0.548  0.252  0.109  1 
H24,vℓ  15 0.375  0213  0.032  0.717 
H33,ℓℓ  22 0.864  0.224  0.354  1 
H34,ℓℓ  22 0.578  0.193  0.270  1 
H44,ℓℓ  42 0.634  0.213  0.337  1   17
(I) H0: βmk,ℓℓ = βkm,ℓℓ, 
(II) H0: βmk,ℓv = βkm,vℓ, 
where the β’s are the coefficients of the corresponding VHHI’s. Using a Wald test, we failed to 
reject the null hypotheses in I and II and symmetry restrictions were imposed.  
Table 2 reports the model estimation using 2SLS, with heteroscedastic-robust standard 
errors under clustering.  We first discuss the estimates of how prices vary across seed types and 
vertical structures, followed by a discussion of the estimated effects of market power.   
Compared to conventional seeds, the results show that all biotech seeds receive a price premium 
that varies with the vertical structure. The coefficients of the TiDv’s (i
th seed under integrated 
vertical structure) and TiDℓ’s (i-th seed under licensing vertical structure), i = 2, 3, 4, are each 
positive and statistically significant. Being in the range from $75.12 to $162.88, they show 
evidence of significant premiums for these biotech traits. Additionally, the stacked biotech seeds 
are sold at a higher price than the single trait biotech seeds, while the additional premium seems 
to be lower than the premium of that relevant trait in the single trait system. Of course, such price 
premiums must be justified in cost/time savings to the farmer and/or increased yields derived 
from a bag of planted seed.  
The model incorporates market share information about each seed type in different 
vertical structures using the VHHIs. All of the traditional HHI terms (H11,ℓℓ, H22,vv, H22,ℓℓ, H33,ℓℓ,  
and H44,ℓℓ) are positive and all but one (H22,ℓℓ) is statistically different from zero. These findings 
reveal that direct competition of similar types of seeds (i.e. conventional, HT-vertically 
integrated, IR-licensed, and stacked HT/IR-licensed) matters a great deal in the prices that 
farmers pay. The positive sign for H11,ℓℓ, confirms that, for conventional seeds, higher market 
concentration leads to higher prices.  Similar findings are present for vertically integrated   18
herbicide tolerance (H22,vv), licensed insect resistant (H33,ℓℓ)  and licensed stacked traited (H44,ℓℓ) 
seeds.  Note that we broke out the traditional HHIs in the HT market into two modes of vertical 
delivery: integration (v) and licensing (ℓ). The traditional HHI for the integrated HT market was 
significant but not so for the licensed HT market. This seems to infer that farmers purchasing 
seed with licensed biotech traits do not have a strong purchase preference and are more apt to 
substitute with other seed types than farmers that purchase from the integrated seed company.   
We have argued in section 2 that the effects of VHHI Hmk,uτ, k ≠ m, and/or u ≠ τ  depend 
on the substitutability/complementarity relationship between the type-m seed in u-th market 
structure and the type-k seed in τ -th market structure. We expect that an increase in the VHHI 
will be associated with a rise (decrease) in the price if the two types of seed are substitutes 
(complements).  For the four cross market VHHIs that may affect the conventional seed price 
(H21,ℓℓ, H21,vℓ, H31,ℓℓ, H41,ℓℓ), all are negative and all but H21,ℓℓ,  is statistically different from zero. 
These results provide evidence that there exist complementarity relationships between 
conventional seeds and other type of seeds.  
Of the three cross VHHIs that may affect the pricing of HT biotech seed in the vertically 
integrated structure (H12,ℓv, , H32,ℓv, H42,ℓv), all are statistically significant., H32,ℓv is positive and 
the remaining two (H12,ℓv, H42,ℓv) are negative.  Of the three cross VHHIs that may affect the 
pricing of HT biotech seed in the licensing structure (H12,ℓℓ, H32,ℓℓ, H42,ℓℓ),  only the H42,ℓℓ is 
statistically significant.  For the HT market, we also capture the cross effects derived from the 
two vertical structures: vertically integrated HT seed market’s impacts on the HT licensed 
market (H22,ℓv) and vice versa (H22, vℓ).  Both of these terms are positive and statistically 
significant, but the magnitude of each effect is quite different.  It seems the impact of the vertical 
integration on the licensed market is over twice as strong as the impact of licensing on the   19
vertically integrated market.  This is consistent with our earlier finding that the traditional HHI 
for vertically integrated HT markets was significant while the licensed market was not.  
Under the symmetry restrictions, several of the coefficients of VHHIs affecting the 
licensed IR seed and the stacked HT/IR seeds have been discussed.  The effect of the VHHI 
between the licensed IR1 seed and the licensed stacking seed (H43,ℓℓ) is negative and statistically 
significant.  This implies a complementary relationship.   
One area of interest is the issue of vertical organization’s affect on pricing.  From our 
results, we can evaluate whether market concentrations have similar impacts on seed prices in 
alternative vertical structures from the following set of hypotheses:  
(III) H0: βkm,ℓℓ = βkm,vℓ = βkm,vv = βkm,ℓv.  
We conducted Wald test for the null hypotheses H21,ℓℓ = H21,vℓ, H42,ℓℓ = H42,ℓv, and H23,ℓℓ = 
H23,vℓ, and all are rejected at 5% significance level. This provides strong statistical evidence that 
vertical organization matters. It indicates that vertical structures interact with the exercise of 
market power as they affect pricing. Further implications of the estimated model are evaluated 
below (see section 5) with a focus on the effects of changing market conditions on cottonseed 
pricing.     
 
Table 2 – 2SLS estimation with robust standard errors clustered at farm level
a, b, c 
Dependent Variable: Net Price ($/bag) Coefficient  Robust  z  statistics 
Seed type effects, benchmark is T1: Conventional seed 
T2Dℓ (HT in licensing structure) 85.24***  11.71 
T2Dv (HT in vertically integrated structure)  79.95***  7.37 
T3Dℓ (IR in licensing structure)  75.13***  4.95 
T3Dv (IR in vertically integrated structure)  130.32***  11.46 
T4Dℓ (stacking in licensing structure)  120.20***  18.81 
T4Dv (stacking in vertically integrated structure)  162.88***  25.09   20
Market concentration effects 
H11,ℓℓT1DℓY1ℓ (on conventional seed)  0.198***  4.41 
H21,ℓℓT1DℓY2ℓ (on conventional seed), and 
H12,ℓℓT2DℓY1ℓ (on HT1 in licensing structure) 
-0.075 -1.04 
H21,vℓT1DℓY2v (on conventional seed), and  
H12,ℓvT2DvY1ℓ (on HT1 in vertically integrated structure) 
-0.715*** -3.61 
H31,ℓℓT1DℓY3ℓ (on conventional seed), and  
H13,ℓℓT3DℓY1ℓ (on IR1 in licensing structure) 
-0.636** -2.03 
H41,ℓℓT1DℓY4ℓ (on conventional seed), and  





H22,ℓvT2DvY2ℓ (on HT in vertically integrated structure)  4.249***  3.01 
H22,vvT2DvY2v (on HT in vertically integrated structure)  4.482***  5.09 
H32, ℓvT2DvY3v (on HT in vertically integrated structure), 
and  
H23,vℓT3DℓY2v (on IR in licensing structure) 
6.824*** 3.10 
H42, ℓvT2DvY4v (on HT in vertically integrated structure), 
and  
H24,vℓT4DℓY2v (on stacking seed in licensing structure) 
-5.735*** -3.36 
H22,ℓℓT2DℓY2ℓ (on HT in licensing structure)  0.061  0.39 
H22,vℓT2DℓY2v (on HT in licensing structure)  1.643***  2.64 
H32,ℓℓT2DℓY3ℓ (on HT in licensing structure), and 
H23,ℓℓT3DℓY2ℓ (on IR in licensing structure) 
0.937 0.91 
H42,ℓℓT2DℓY4ℓ (on HT in licensing structure), and 
H24,ℓℓT4DℓY2ℓ (on stacking seed in licensing structure) 
-0.495** -2.45 
H33,ℓℓT3DℓY3ℓ (on IR in licensing structure)  7.573*  1.74 
H43,ℓℓT3DℓY4ℓ (on IR in licensing structure), and 
H34,ℓℓT4DℓY3ℓ (on stacking seed in licensing structure) 
-2.665*** -3.01 
H44,ℓℓT4DℓY4ℓ (on stacking seed in licensing structure)  1.248***  5.37 
Other variables 
Location (Oklahoma)  5.26  0.77 
Year 2004  18.29***  3.26 
Year 2005  -25.42***  -4.92 
Year 2006  58.38***  10.43 
Year 2007  76.22***  14.95 
Total acre grown cotton by each farm (1000 acre)  -0.82  -0.63 
Constant 24.16***  4.15 
Number of observations  3518
 
a Statistical significance is noted by * at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, ** at the 1 percent 
level.  
b The centered R
2 is 0.59, and un-centered R
2 is 0.88. 
c Results for the purchase source effects are not reported here to save space, but are discussed in 
the text. 
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Table 2 also shows how prices vary over time with respect other factors.  The year 
dummy effects show dramatic changes during our study period: in 2004, seed price is $18.29 per 
bag higher than in 2003, and the price in 2005 is $25.42 per bag less than in 2003. Price in 2006 
increase from the previous year to $58.38 per bag higher than in 2003, and increase further in 
2007 to $76.22 per bag higher than in 2003. Given that the mean price is about $122.80 per bag, 
this gives an annual change rate between 15% and 70%.  Whether the seeds are sold in Texas or 
Oklahoma does not affect price. This is evidence that there are not statewide institutions, policies 
or programs that impact Oklahoma cottonseed sales differently than in the upland Texas region.  
There is also no evidence that the method of purchase affects prices. Finally, table 2 shows that 
the farm size effect is not statistically significant. 
 
5.  Implications  
While the results in Table 2 reveal the factors affecting the price of cotton seeds, the 
effects of changes in market conditions are complex in a multi-market context. In this section, 
we explore the implications of our econometric estimates by simulating the effects of alternative 
market scenarios for cotton seed pricing. We focus our attention on two sets of scenarios: 1/ the 
impact of stacking/bundling of biotech traits; and 2/ the impacts of market size and changing 
market structures. To support hypothesis testing across scenarios, all simulated prices are 
bootstrapped.  
5.1. Effects of Stacking/Bundling in Different Markets 
The implications of stacking for cottonseed prices are presented in Table 3. Evaluated at 
sample means, Table 3 shows that the prices for biotech seeds (T2, T3 and T4) are significantly 
higher than the price of conventional seeds (T1). This is true under both licensing and vertical   22
integration. The price premium paid for biotech traits (compared to conventional seeds) reflects 
that biotech seeds provide farm productivity gains (by increasing yield and reducing herbicide 
and pesticide use). It also indicates that these gains generate farm profits that are captured in part 
by seed companies (in the form of higher seed prices). Table 3 shows that the price of stacked 
seeds (T4) is higher than the price of single-trait seeds (T2 or T3). It also reports stacking effects 
by comparing the price premium of stacked seeds (T4) versus the sum of the premium for single-
trait seeds (T2 and T3).  The results show that the premium for stacked seeds is less than the sum 
of the premium for single trait seeds. The difference is statistically significant. This infers a 
rejection of component pricing for biotech seeds (where seeds would be valued as the sum of 
their component values) in favor of sub-additive pricing (where stacked/bundled seeds are sold at 
a discount compared to the pricing of the individual components). To the extent that both HT and 
IR technology increases productivity, this provides an incentive for farmers to purchase 
stacked/bundled seeds (as compared to single-trait biotech seeds). The discounting of bundled 
traits may reflect complementarities and economies of scope in the production and marketing of 
biotech traits. In this case, the joint production and marketing of biotech traits may contribute to 
lowering cost, which may be shared in part with farmers in the form of price discounts offered by 
seed companies.  
Table 3 also shows how vertical structures affect pricing. Evaluated at sample means, it 
reports that seed prices are lower under licensing than under vertical integration. The difference 
is statistically significant for HT (T2) and stacked seeds (T4). This indicates that vertical 
integration contributes to increasing the price paid by farmers. Without data on productivity, it is 
unclear whether such effects could be due to quality differences between seeds sold under 
vertical integration versus licensing. Finally, Table 3 shows that stacking effects do not vary   23
systematically across vertical structures: sub-additivity in pricing applies under both vertical 
integration and licensing, and the associated price discounts are not statistically different 
between the two vertical organizations.  
 
Table 3 – Effects of Bundling/Stacking in Different Markets on Seed Prices, $/bag.
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a Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance is noted by * at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent 
level, and *** at the 1 percent level.  
 
 
5.2. Effects of Changing Market Size and Market Structures 
The effects of changing market conditions are examined by evaluating two effects: the 
impact of changing market size (as measured by the Ys); and the impact of changing market 
concentrations (as measured by the VHHIs). For simplicity, we focus our attention on observed 
changes taking place between 2002 and 2006.   
The effects of changing market sizes between 2002 and 2006 are reported in Table 4, 
holding the VHHIs at their 2002 level. From 2002 to 2006, both the conventional seed and HT 
licensed seed have exhibited a declining market share, while the shares in integrated HT, IR and 
stacked seeds have increased. Table 4 shows that, ceteris paribus, changing market sizes implied   24
that the price of conventional seed decrease by $12.06 (significant at 1% level), the price of 
licensed HT seed decrease by $16.91 (significant at 5% level), the price of the licensed stacking 
seed will increase by $27.83 (significant at 10%) and the price of vertically integrated HT seed 
increases by $23.56 (significant at 10%).  This documents significant effects of market sizes on 
seed pricing.  
 





























N/A N/A N/A 







































N/A N/A N/A 
a Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance is noted by * at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent 
level, and *** at the 1 percent level.  
 
 
The effects of changing own market concentrations (as measured by the traditional HHIs) 
between 2002 and 2006 are reported in Table 5, holding the Ys and cross VHHIs at their 2002 
level. From 2002 to 2006, all traditional HHIs (H11ℓℓ, H22ℓℓ, H22vv, H44ℓℓ) decreased, with the 
exception of H33ℓℓ, which increased. These own-market concentration measures indicate a trend 
toward greater competition between 2002 and 2006 in the Texas cottonseed market, which 
reflects the successful entry by Bayer CropScience through its FiberMax flagship, starting in 
1999 and taking off since 2002. Table 5 shows that, ceteris paribus, changing own-market   25
concentrations implied that, except for the licensed IR1 seeds, all price changes are negative. 
This is consistent with the patterns of changes in traditional HHIs. The price reduction is $1.78 
for the conventional seed, $0.56 for the integrated HT seed, and $3.96 for the stacking seed (all 
significant at 1% level).  
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N/A N/A N/A 
a Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance is noted by * at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent 
level, and *** at the 1 percent level.  
 
Finally, the effects of changing all market concentrations (as measured by both the HHIs 
and the VHHIs) between 2002 and 2006 are reported in Table 6, holding the Ys at their 2002 
level. During these four years, eight VHHIs decreased (H12ℓℓ, H14ℓℓ, H24ℓℓ, H24vℓ, H13ℓℓ, H23ℓℓ, H23vℓ, 
H32ℓℓ), while two VHHIs increased (H12ℓv and H22ℓv). This again may be due to the Bayer 
CropScience effect.  Table 6 shows that, ceteris paribus, recent changes in market concentrations 
implied some increases in all prices. Contrasting the results in Tables 5 and 6 illustrates the 
important role played by cross-market concentration measures. In Table 5, generally declining 
levels of traditional HHIs led to three statistically significant price declines.  By including the   26
cross HHIs to the simulation, two of the prices are now statistically significant and higher in 
2006 compared to 2002: the price of vertically integrated HT seed (+$73.30, significant at 1% 
level) and that of the licensed stacked seeds (+$16.82, significant at 1% level).These results 
underscore complementarity effects identified in our econometric analysis impact the linkages 
between market concentrations and pricing. This also stresses the importance of evaluating 
changing market structures in a multi-product framework.   
 
Table 6 – Simulated Effects of Changing all Market Concentrations (HHIs and VHHIs), 








































































N/A N/A N/A 
a Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance is noted by * at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent 
level, and *** at the 1 percent level.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the impact of differentiated vertical strategies by the 
biotechnology firms in the U.S. cottonseed market.  The approach advances the measurement of 
industry concentration to consider substitution/complementarity relationships among 
differentiated products delivered under different vertical structures. The model is flexible and 
allows for evaluation of the effects of changing market restructures.     27
Applied to the pricing in the U.S. cottonseed market, the econometric analysis provides 
useful information on the implications of product differentiation and vertical organization. It 
evaluates the differential pricing of conventional seeds as well as patented biotech seeds, 
including herbicide tolerance (HT) seeds, insect resistant (IR) seeds, and stacked/bundled seeds. 
We find evidence of sub-additive pricing in stacked seeds. The analysis also allows an evaluation 
of the effects of imperfect competition on pricing. As expected, we find that increased market 
concentration tends to increase price in the corresponding market. But our estimates also show 
evidence of cross-market complementarities that affects the linkages between market 
concentrations and pricing. Finally, we analyze how vertical organization affects pricing. We 
find that pricing of seed from VIB firms is higher than the price of biotech seeds sold under 
licensing arrangement.  Additional research is needed to explain such pricing patterns.    
Simulations of the estimated model provided additional insights on the pricing of 
cottonseeds. The first simulation documented the sub-additive pricing in stacked seeds.  The 
second simulation showed how changing market sizes affected seed prices. The third and fourth 
simulations evaluated the effects of changing market structure (i.e. concentration) on prices. 
They illustrated the effects of changes in cross-market concentrations. This stresses the need to 
evaluate changes in both horizontal and vertical market structures in a multi-market context.    28
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